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Abstract
In this thesis, we examine the eect of four cultural variables on economic
growth using data from World Values Survey, specically, attitudes toward hard
work, family ties, generalized morality, and views regarding the appropriate role
of women in society. Compared to the previous studies, we use Instrumental
Variable Bayesian Model Averaging (IVBMA) to deal rigorously with model
uncertainty, omitted variable bias, and endogeneity of culture at the same time.
We consider a number of instruments: genetic distance, legal origins, index of
historical prevalence of infectious diseases, predicted trade shares, and historical
plough use. Most of them have been widely used in growth economics literature.
Examining twenty-nine regressors for forty-six countries, our results point to
the importance of cultural variables for economic development. The strongest
support receives family ties and attitudes toward hard work. Additionally, we
nd considerable support for other variables, namely ground frost, soil depth
and trade.
JEL Classication C11, O11, O47
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Proposed Topic:
Which Aspects of Culture Play an Important Role in Economic
Development?
Motivation:
The importance of culture in explaining individual behaviour and economic
success was recognized several centuries ago by, for example, Adam Smith, a
century later by Karl Max and Max Weber. However, the marginalist
revolution in economics sidelined cultural factors for some time. Today, the
importance of culture has become widely recognized as it is illustrated by the
main four areas of study: (1) Entrepreneurial culture, (2) Trust, (3)
International business, (4) Comparative corporate governance (Beugelsdijk
and Maseland 2011). Events such as the spectacular rise of East Asia or
communism's demise contributed to the perception that models assuming
full rationality and ecient markets are able to provide a very limited
explanation of economic development. In this context, culture is seen as a
possible deep determinant of economic development (Hall and Jones 1999;
Acemoglu et al. 2001; Rodrik et al. 2004; Sen 2004; La Porta et al. 2008).
Hypotheses:
1. Hypothesis #1: Is there a strong causal relationship between culture
(aspects of culture) and economic development?
2. Hypothesis #2: Are there certain aspects of culture that are
signicantly more conducive to economic development than others?
3. Hypothesis #3: Are these aspects of culture endogenous?
Methodology:
For the empirical testing, I plan to use cross-country regression using
Bayesian Model Averaging framework. Such technique allows us to include
many more regressors in a single-regression equation than classical
econometrics, eectively reducing model uncertainty and omitted variable
bias. To account for the possible endogeneity of culture, I intend to use
Instrumental Variable Bayesian Model Averaging developed by Karl and
Lenkoski 2012. The source of data will be World Values Survey, designed for
cross-national comparison of values and norms.
Expected Contribution:
The expected contribution is to evaluate the relationship between culture
and economic development within the rigorous framework of BMA
(IVBMA). This technique gives us more condence in the results because we
simultaneously deal with model uncertainty and omitted variable bias. The
previous literature does not account for these issues even though empirical
growth literature accentuates model uncertainty (Fernandez et al. 2001;
Durlauf et al. 2004; Eicher et al. 2012). Furthermore, this thesis aims to
identify instrumental variables for proxy of culture since some previous works
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Why disparities in levels of income and development substantially dier and are
persistent is one of the central questions in growth economics. The world's rich-
est and poorest countries level of gross domestic product per capita diers by a
factor of 209. The Central African Republic, the poorest nation in the world for
which the national statistics are available, has an income per capita of $630. By
contrast, Qatar's income per capita is $132,099.1 Naturally, a following question
arises - what factors are behind these enormous dierences in income and how
can we mitigate them? Although economists have been trying to identify the
fundamental forces that would explain dierences in income for decades, our
knowledge and understanding still is not deep enough to solve this puzzle. This
thesis investigates one of many determinants of economic growth - culture. The
idea that culture is a central driver of economic growth goes back to at least
Max Weber and his classical work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Cap-
italism, in which he argues that the Protestant ethic of Calvinism was a major
force behind the development of capitalism in its early stage. Weber saw culture
as a causal force with respect to economic development. By contrast, Karl Max
held a view that culture is determined by the level of economic development and
by the economic interests of diverse social classes. Although Greif (1994) and
Landes (1998), among others, have argued that culture plays an essential role
in explaining the dierences in income, cultural economics is still in its infancy.
Among most notable studies that were at the beginning of empirical research
of culture and its impact on economic development is Putnam et al.'s (1993)
work which investigates dierences in institutions in Italy, and these dierences
are traced back to certain cultural traits developed hundreds of years ago. An-
other important contribution is Knack and Keefer's (1997) work in which they
attempt to explain dierences in growth rates by including the famous question
about trust from World Values Survey. Furthermore, recent research shows that
cultural variables inuence many economic outcomes. They even determine the
speed of development and the wealth of nations (Guiso et al 2006; Fernandez
2008, 2011; Landes 1998).
Empirical growth literature accentuates model uncertainty (Fernandez et
al. 2001; Durlauf et al. 2004; Eicher et al. 2012, among others). Growth
econometrics has been successful in identifying determinants of growth, and
plentiful theories have been developed. Hence, there is a signicant degree of
uncertainty about the true model of economic growth.
This thesis aims to contribute to the current literature by analyzing the
impact of four cultural variables on economic growth, assessing their relative
importance, and dealing with the following issues at the same time: (i) reduc-
ing omitted variable bias, (ii) evaluating several cultural variables in the same
regression equation and (iii) coping with endogeneity of culture. We deal with
model uncertainty by employing Instrumental Variable Bayesian Model Averag-
ing (IVBMA) technique developed by Karl and Lenkoski (2012) which allows us
1The gures are in international dollars and are for year 2015. Source of data is Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.
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to include many more regressors compared to classical econometrics. Therefore,
it helps us to mitigate omitted variable bias and also incorporate instrumental
variable procedure within BMA framework. We analyze four cultural variables
in total: attitudes toward hard work, family ties, views about the appropriate
role of women in society, and generalized morality using World Values Survey.
All these variables have been used in literature to analyze impact of culture on
numerous economic outcomes (Alesina and Giuliano 2010; Alesina et al. 2013;
Tabellini 2008, 2010)
The results based on 46 countries and 29 explanatory variables suggest that
culture is likely to play an important role in economic development, but given
the numerous methodological problems (see Section 2), we interpret these results
with caution. Moreover, our ndings give considerable support to competing
theories, namely to geographical and trade theories.
This thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 presents methodological issues
and limitations connected with including culture in economic analysis. Section
3 reviews the relevant literature. A description of the data can be found in
Section 4. Section 5 presents econometric specication and results. Finally,
Section 6 concludes. Appendix with additional tables and detailed description
of data follows.
2 Methodological issues and Limitations
In this section, we provide an overview of most important methodological
issues when investigating the relationship between culture and economics. We
do not cover all topics of research but focus our attention on most important
ones. Additionally, we discuss the most common methods to study the impact
of culture on economic development.
There are three main methodological problems when including culture in
economics. Beugelsdijk and Maseland (2011) identify culture as being:
1) human-made
2) about ideas and worldviews underlying behaviour
3) about distinction between collective indetities
4) assumed as given to the individiual.
Since economics work from a model of reality in which behavioral patters
are retraceable to individual, misalignment between cultural structures and eco-
nomic theory occurs. Another problem that is closely related to this issue is the
fact that most economic theory is based on the micro-economic behaviour of in-
dividual (Hodgson 2007a, 2007b) while culture operates at the collective level.
The last issue we are going to discuss is of a dierent nature. Economists make
an eort to establish universal laws and behaviour which is in contrast with
cultural logics and perceptions of reality. For example, rationality can be uni-
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versal but the results of the rational decision-making vary in dierent cultures,
hence invalidating the universal model of economic decision-making. This ten-
sion between universalistic approach of economics and particularistic nature of
culture comes from the phenomenon of a cultural bias. Beugelsdijk and Mase-
land (2011) argue that  the very distinction between the economic - referring to
allegedly universal structures of behaviour modeled on West European and US
self-images - and culture - referring to that which deviates from these structures
- is already informed by ethnocentric bias raises a methodological challenge.
Every researcher has been trained in ways determined by her or his culture and
so has to deal with this issue.
2.1 Methodological Challenges
From micro-level to macro-level
As we said, a methodological division between culture and economic theory
lies in level disparity. Economic analysis starts out from individual level while
culture operates at the collective level. There have been given three answers how
to alleviate this misalignment. One way is to approach all behaviour as deter-
mined by structures. In other words, we bring economic theory to macro-level.
The second approach sees culture as a result of actions by individuals, reducing
all social phenomena to individual economic decisions. The third method deals
with misalignment of culture and economics in a dierent way. It brings them
together forming a single theoretical model. An example of such approach is the
new institutional economics of Douglass North. However, this approach makes
empirical work complicated. All suggested solutions have its pitfalls, and there
is no clear winner. A detailed description of these issues can be found in Robin-
son (1950), Klein et al. 1994 and Manski (2000). Only approaches like Becker's
everything is economics can avoid the discussion.
The second methodological issue is connected with the distinction between
universality and that of particular. Beugelsdijk and Maseland (2011) provide a
useful typology of studies of culture in economics adapted from Adler (1983).
The typology is divided into two groups of studies. Idiographic research focuses
on economic behaviour in its specic contexts while nomothetic research as-
sumes that universal behaviour exists. Thus, the key distinction between those
two is how they cope with their cultural perspective vis-a-vis other cultural
perspectives. The idiographic research consists of parochial, ethnocentric and
polycentric approaches. These approaches study cultures on a case-by-case ba-
sis, however, vary in their research focus. The nomothetic research is composed
of comparative, geocentric and synergistic approaches. These methods assume
universal behaviour but vary in the way how universality is achieved.
Idiographic approaches
The rst category is parochial research which assumes that researcher, audi-
ence and research subject all come from the identical cultural background and
so they are not aware of the implications of cultural dierence. As a result,
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even though a study is developed in one cultural context, it is thought to be
applicable universally. Much of parochial approach can be found in economics
that claims to deal with universal behaviour and mechanism although it has
mainly been a product America and Europe.
Another line of studies is ethnocentric research. This approach, unlike
parochial one, acknowledges dierent cultural structures and these structures
are the object under study. However, insights from the perspective of home cul-
ture are applicable regardless of context. Thus, the dierence with the parochial
research lies in dierent cultures under consideration. Popkin (1979) is an ex-
ample of a variant of ethnocentric approach that copes with the question of
applicability of insights developed in culture A on culture B. He argues that
Vietnamese peasants' behaviour is economically rational when choosing crops.
Although it is not assumed that people automatically behave rationally, it is
deemed that economic rationality is a yardstick for investigating other cultures
- instead of asking what is their behaviour like? we pose the question:Are
they behaving like us? Popkin's work can be thought of as questioning of ap-
plicability of rationality to developing countries. In this context, rationality is
seen as the standard from which other cultures are assessed.
The last approach recognises that theories developed in one cultural setting
have limited applicability. It focuses on establishing which elements of behaviour
are culturally specic and describe it in terms of its own culture and at the
same time developing a more general theory about the elements that exist in all
cultures. Polycentric research assumes that behaviour is understandable only
in terms of its own culture. In this way, one can avoid ethnocentrism because
the applicability of insights is limited only within the context they have been
developed.
Taking up such a position makes it impossible to describe anything that goes
beyond the culture under consideration. Because each culture is unique, there
are common structures or laws of behaviour based on which we can compare
cultures. Not everybody adopts such extreme approach. The claim that there is
no shared element of behaviour across cultures is not generally accepted. Hence,
one can analyse cultural dierences using other than idiographic research which
depicts only the uniqueness of one case of culture. Such body of research is called
nomothetic research which tries to establish general laws about behaviour.
Nomothetic approaches
The rst approach in the row is comparative research. It assumes that
universal dimensions of human behaviour exist and we can compare cultural
dierences using scores. Nevertheless, such approach has to be careful not
to fall into ethnocentrism. Let's say we are looking for dierences between
two cultures. We need to establish a common perspective based on which we
can compare cultures under study in order to carry out a meaningful research.
However, a sensible inquiry into cultural dierences requires (a) a scale on which
comparison can be made and (b) comparable units of culture.
To nd suitable units of culture is not an easy task. Usually, when we com-
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pare cultures, we compare states (Hofstede 1980, 2001; Iglehart 1997). However,
a state has geographical boundaries and not necessarily cultural ones. To as-
sume that one state equal one culture, that is the geographical boundaries of a
state correspond to cultural boundaries of a community is a strong assumption.
For example, one state can be predominantly Muslim in some areas while in
other areas Christianity is the main religion. Even though using states as units
has been criticised (McSweeney 2002a, 2002b) there is not consensus on which
units would prevent potential problems.
Finding appropriate scales relevant for all culture under consideration is
also a methodological challenge. Colonial heritage, language, religion or family
structure have been used as categories for classifying and ranking cultures (Todd
1985; Stulz and Williamson 2003; Lane and Ersson 2005;). Using such variables
may look plausible at rst, but when we take a closer look, problems still appear.
Frequently it is assumed that being a member of one religion group means
being not a member of any other. While this is true for many faiths such as
Christianity or Islam, it is not true for Buddhism or Taoism. Furthermore,
most religions can be divided into various denominations. Even if research
includes such denominations in their research, they are more aware of religion
they grew up in. For example, Barro and McCleary (2003) include in their
analysis Protestantism, Catholicism and Orthodox faith (specic traditions of
Christianity), but Islam is only a single category. Moreover, members of the
same denomination have very dierent opinions on topics outside of their religion
(Iannaccone 1992a).
Next approach is geocentric research. In this research, insights are univer-
sally applicable, researcher and audience share the same culture so there are no
cultural barriers, but the research subject is global - foreign direct investment,
international trade or behaviour of multinationals. The crucial assumption is
that culture is irrelevant in analysing these elements of behaviour of rms and
individuals.
Lastly, synergistic approach diers in research question but keeps nomo-
thetic approach toward culture. The question it attempts to answer is how
individuals behave in interaction with other cultures while sharing assumption
of universality with the comparative and geocentric research.
2 METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND LIMITATIONS 6
2.2 Research Methods
In the eld of cultural economics, there are several research methods used.
However, we limit our discussion to cross-cultural comparative experiments and
cross-country regressions on quantied data about culture because this line of
research is specic to cultural studies.
Comparative experiments
The surge of experiments in economics in recent decades has been driven by
a desire to create models based rather on actual patterns of behaviour and so-
cial practice of agents than stylised facts about behaviour of individuals (Bowles
2004). In recent years, experiments have been popular in demonstrating devia-
tions from rationality assumption. Individuals behave more cooperatively and
less opportunistically than it had been shown in mainstream theory. People
with dierent cultural backgrounds participating in comparative experiments
are usually asked to play a game. One example of a game is a so-called ultima-
tum game. The game includes two players and a sum of money. Player one gets
to decide how much he or she wants to oer the other player. Player two can
either accept the oered amount of money in which case both players get the
agreed amount or reject in which case neither of player gets anything. Roth et
al. (1991) nd out that highly inequal proposals are rejected among developed
countries contradicting homo oeconomicus. Henrich (2000) and Henrich et al.
(2006) carry out a similar experiment with participants from both developing
and developed societies and reveals that members of developing societies tend
to accept lower sum of money than members of developed societies (and so
behaving like homo oeconomicus).
Plentiful articles were published in recent years (Gachter et al. 2005; Gachter
and Hermann 2009; Gintis 2008) along with overview books on dierences in
institutions, habits and economic behaviour using experimental methods (Os-
trom 2005; Greif 2006). Samuelson (2005) summarises the main ndings of
ultimatum games. The results of such games dier signicantly across societies
and behavioural outcomes are related to the society in which experiments are
carried out. Furthermore, intra-group dierences such as age or gender show
only marginal signicance. Lastly, an evidence about preferences being shaped
by culture and way of life is provided.
As with every method, comparative experiments have its drawbacks. Firstly,
experiments operate on individual level while culture refers to collective struc-
tures. Thus, in order to generalise the results of experiments we need to assume
that the behaviour found in the experiment is representative behaviour of the
collective we aim to describe. In other words, comparative experiments have
an issue with showing characteristics of the culture because their focus is on
characteristics of individual behaviour.
Cultural bias also represents an obstacle. The assumption that the relation
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between playing games and behaviour of individuals in everyday life is same
in all societies is a source of ethnocentric bias. Such assumption is unrealistic
since behaviour while playing games might be unacceptable in society A while
it could be a part of daily life in society B. Hence, the results of games might
not say much about willingness to cooperate or trust each other.
Values surveys and dimensions of culture
Cross-cultural surveys are the most popular method when comparing cul-
tures. The well-known sources of data are the datasets developed by Schwartz,
Hofstede, the European Values Survey, World Values Survey and in recent years
the Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Eectiveness (GLOBE)
project. The surveys are conducted in a number of countries, asking a broad
set of questions. The items are formed into dimensions on which dierent cul-
tures can be ranked or scored. Surveys require a construction of scales because
survey is a form of comparative research. There are two options; derive scales
empirically or theoretically. We will talk about these methods as we introduce
aforementioned surveys.
Hofstede's dimensions of culture
Geert Hofstede is well know for his ground-breaking book on cross-cultural
dierences, Culture's Consequences: International Dierences in Work-Related
Values. While working at IBM, Hofstede created a database of 116 000 morale
surveys and interviewed 88 000 IBM employees living in 72 countries and regions.
Based on data from IBM, Hofstede developed four cultural dimensions of culture:
1) Power Distance can be dened as the degree of inequality among people
which the population of a country considers as normal: from relatively equal
(that is, small power distance) to extremely unequal (large power distance).
2) Uncertainty Avoidance can be dened as the degree to which people in
a country prefer structured over unstructured situations. Structured situations
are those in which there are clear rules as to how one should behave. These
rules can be written down, but they can also been unwritten and imposed by
tradition.
3) Individualism vs. Collectivism, which is the degree to which people
in a country prefer to act as individuals rather than as members of groups.
4) Masculinity vs. Feminity is the degree to which values like assertive-
ness, performance, success and competition, which in nearly all societies are
associated with the role of men, prevail over values like the quality of life, main-
taining warm personal relationships, service, care for the weak, and solidarity,
which in nearly all societies are more associated with the role of women.
Each country is assigned a score on each dimension between 0 and 100 to
show how interviewees feel about societal issues in question. Hofstede's work
has received recognition but also a considerable amount of criticism. Concretely,
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Schwartz pointed out several methodological issues such as lack of a theoreti-
cal framework and the need to use value measures that have the same mean-
ing across cultures at the individual level (Schwartz 1994, 1999, 2004, 2006).
Schwartz developed his own framework where he rst theoretically derives a
number of culture dimensions. He surveyed college students and school teachers
from 67 countries between 1988 and 1998. He dened three following dimensions
which are well described in Beugelsdijk and Maseland (2011):
1) Embeddedness/Autonomy: this dimension incorporates the desirable
relationship between the individual and the group. Embeddedness refers to a
cultural emphasis on the person as embedded in the group, while autonomy
refers to a view on individuals as autonomous, independent persons. Schwartz
distinguishes between two types of autonomy. Intellectual autonomy refers to
the extent to which people are free to independently pursue their own ideas and
intellectual directions. Aective autonomy does the same but then with respect
to their aective desires.
2) Hierarchy/Egalitarianism: this dimension refers to the ideal way to
elicit cooperative, productive activity in society. Hierarchy denotes the extent
to which it is legitimate to distribute power, roles and resources unequally.
Egalitarian commitment refers to the extent to which people are inclined to
voluntarily put aside selsh interests to promote the welfare of others.
3)Mastery/Harmony: this dimension is supposed to reect the relation of
humankind to the natural and social world. Mastery expresses the importance
of getting ahead by being self-assertive. Harmony denotes the importance of
tting harmoniously into the environment.
Competing project to Hofstede's and Schwartz's work is the international
research GLOBE team. The goal of GLOBE project is to develop an empirically
based theory to understand, interpret and predict the impact of specic cultural
variables on leadership and organisational processes and the eectiveness of
these processes (House et al. 2001, p. 492). GLOBE project includes nine
dimensions of culture:
1) Power Distance : The degree to which members of a collective expect
power to be distributed equally.
2) Uncertainty Avoidance : The extent to which a society, organization,
or group relies on social norms, rules, and procedures to alleviate unpredictabil-
ity of future events.
3) Humane Orientation : The degree to which a collective encourages
and rewards individuals for being fair, altruistic, generous, caring, and kind to
others.
4) Collectivism I : (Institutional) The degree to which organizational and
societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution o f
resources and collective action.
5) Collectivism II : (In - Group) The degree to which individuals express
pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their organizations or families.
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6)Assertiveness : The degree to which individuals are assertive, confrontat
ional, and aggressive in their relationships with others.
7) Gender Egalitarianism : The degree to which a collective minimizes
gender inequality.
8) Future Orientation : The extent to which individuals engage in future
- oriented behaviors such as delaying gratication, planning, and investing in
the future.
9) Performance Orientation : The degree to which a collective encourages
and rewards group members for performance improvement and excellence.
The methodology and nine dimension are described in detail in House et al.
(2004).
The last survey we are going to discuss is World and European Values Sur-
vey. Both are a cross-national, large-scale, longitudinal surveys exploring human
values. The popularity of these surveys stems from the fact that each country
needs to have at least 1 000 respondents, who might be considered as a repre-
sentative sample of the society, to be included in the project. EVS started in
1981 and initially covered 16 mainly Western European countries. Subsequent
waves include additional countries from Central and Eastern Europe. In the
1990s, WVS emerged from EVS with the aim of better coverage non-Western
countries and included the analysis of the development of a democratic political
culture in emerging democracies. The database of both surveys includes several
hundreds of questions on four topics: religion and morality, work and leisure,
family, and broader societal issues. The studies which analyse the impact of
trust on economic development (Zack and Knack 2001; Roth 2009; Horváth
2011) use the famous question on trust in WVS: Generally speaking, do you
think that most people can be trusted?
Both theoretical or empirical value surveys are not free from criticism. One
obvious problem is that values provide us with data on the micro-level, yet
they are averaged to produce measures of national culture. Moreover, there
is no consensus on a number of dimensions (MacIntosh 1998) because it is a
subjective decision of researchers. Also, we have to ask ourselves what surveys
actually measure. Do they really measure cultural values or they partly capture
what respondents are currently preoccupied with (Clarke et al. 1999)?
There is also an ongoing debate about relation between values that are mea-
sured in surveys and economic outcomes. Hofstede assumes that values explain
outcomes; they are stable and exogenous. However, recent ndings in anthropol-
ogy (Appadurai 1996) or economics (Bowles 1998, 2004) do not support values
as an immutable variable. Lastly, Maseland and Hoorn (2009, 2010) argue
that values measured in surveys are not independent of outcomes, claiming that
rather than measuring underlying values, they measure marginal preferences.
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3 Literature Review
Dening culture is an arduous task as it is a very wide and vague phenomenon.
There are countless denitions of culture. A very basic way is to put it to the op-
position of nature. For example, Ostwald (1907) denes culture as that which
distinguishes men from animals. Of course, such denition is not very useful,
and not only for economists. Nunn (2012) denes culture as decision-making
heuristics or 'rules of thumb' that have evolved given our need to make deci-
sions in complex and uncertain environments. He supports his denition with
research done by Boyd and Richerson (1985, 2005) who use theoretical models
to show that in case information acquisition is either imperfect or costly, the
use of heuristics in decision-making process can arise optimally. Even though
individuals may not behave in a way that is optimal in every moment, by re-
lying on general beliefs or gut feelings, they save on the costs of acquiring the
information that is necessary to behave always optimally (Nunn 2012). In other
words, those beliefs and gut feelings yield fast and economical decision making
that outweighs the costs of imprecision. Hofstede (1980) denes culture as: the
collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one
human group from another.
Some perceive culture as a primitive phenomenon embodied in preferences
and values (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Alesina and Giuliano (2015) point
to a tension between empirical and theoretical denitions of culture. While
empirical denition treats culture as those customary beliefs and values that
ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation
to generation, theoretical denitions treat values and beliefs dierently. Since
we analyze cultural traits used in other studies, which use various denitions of
culture, we do not adopt any specic denition.
Culture can inuence economic development through several channels. One
of them is formal institutions. Historical narratives of specic cases support
the hypothesis that culture inuences institutions. For example, Fisher (1989)
documents how the four migration waves of the original settlers brought their
cultural beliefs that caused signicant dierences in laws. Todd (1990) claims
that underlying values that are ingrained in people from childhood through
family systems determine the development of political systems.
Culture can also inuence formal legal institutions. Lich et al. (2005) in-
vestigate whether laws on the books in various societies mirror the prevailing
national culture. They show that national scores of cultural value dimensions
correlate with indices of creditor rights and shareholder voting rights. In par-
ticular, a national culture that supports assertiveness in reconciling conicting
interests and that supports tolerance for the consequent uncertainty is corre-
lated with using litigation to deal with economic conicts. As a consequence,
a national culture may delay reforms and put country on path dependence in
corporate governance systems.
The last example is democracy. The rst who attempted to relate culture
to democracy were Almond and Verba (1963). They interviewed 1000 people
in ve countries (Great Britain, Mexico, Germany, Italy and the United States)
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and based on that created a measure of political attitudes (cognitive, evaluative
and aective orientations). The authors argue that political culture is essential
to the operation of any political system.
To clearly dene what can be marked as a part of culture in economics re-
search and what is outside of this eld is dicult. Some authors do not explicitly
state that their work belongs to culture-economics literature. Nevertheless, they
deal with structures of behaviour or discuss ideas that they perceive as given
to a group's identity. Other authors use the term culture very loosely. For
example, Ziegler (2007) investigates the international ower trade, evaluating
the dierent cultural meanings of owers and trade relations in the commod-
ity chain. The author points out that owers serve no utilitarian purpose;
rather, they signal consumers' social and cultural decisions about expressing
love, mourning, status, and identity. Even though culture-economics research
is diverse and ambiguous, Beugelsdijk and Maseland (2011) identify the main
four areas of study: (1) International Business, (2) Comparative corporate gov-
ernance, (3) Entrepreneurial culture and (4) Trust. We are not going to cover
the rst three areas since it is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead we are
going to focus on trust studies and extend it by other relevant literature.
Trust
The most investigated aspect of culture is the concept of social capital of
which trust is deemed to be the most important dimension (Fukuyama 1995).
Trust received a great deal of attention, pioneering study was done by Knack
and Keefer (1997) where per capita growth is regressed on trust. Its importance
is highlighted by many studies such as Guiso et al.'s (2006), Tabelllini's (2007)
presidential lecture at the yearly meeting of the European Economic Association
or by Dixit (2009). The popularization of trust (and culture) started o with
Putnam et al.'s (1993) work on Italian regions in which they argue that the
crucial factor in explaining eectiveness of regional governments and economic
performance in Italy is due to regional dierences in social structure. Putnam
et al. (1993) compare horizontal and vertical social relationships and claim
that horizontal relationships, based on trust and shared values, are associated
with higher social capital, and the economy is more ecient. Putnam's study
spurred a vivid discussion and triggered numerous studies trying to relate social
capital with national economic performance. Before we go into reviewing the
extensive literature, it is essential to be aware of the classication of trust. We
need to distinguish between the sources of trust, the scope of trust and levels
of trust. For the scope of trust, we need to ask: whom do we believe? Do
we tend to believe the society in general, or just a few people within a small
circle? With regard to the levels of trust, we are interested whether trust takes
place among individuals or trust within society as a whole. Lastly, the sources
of trust can stem from general norms of society or trust coming from bounded
rational decision-making.
Trust is usually dened as a characteristic of interpersonal relationships or
a property of individuals. One can think of trust as an expectation of one's
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reliability with respect to their fairness, the predictability of behaviour and
obligations in actions and negotiations while having a possibility to behave op-
portunistically (Zaheer at el. 1998). To relate culture (trust) to macroeconomic
outcomes is a dicult task because we have a theory that operates on micro
level, yet we need to carry out analysis on macro level (culture is a phenomenon
at macro level).
The attraction of trust lies in its micro-foundations which t the commonly
used frameworks in economics. It requires a slight modication to include trust
in most of the models. Moreover, due to trust having psychological aspects, it
is a suitable object for behavioral economics (Fehr 2009). Lastly, the possibility
to move up trust from micro to macro-level allows to develop hypotheses at the
societal level. The credibility and strength of trust have been further reinforced
by the fact that formed hypothesis coincides with real world observations of
Putnam et al. (1993) and many others (Baneld 1958; Greif 2006).
Several direct channels through which trust might aect macro-economic
benets have been suggested. One argument concerns the reduction of trans-
action costs (Lane and Bachmann 1998; Nooteboom 2002). Firstly, it reduces
transaction costs via the third party providing options for control in social net-
works. Secondly, trust is connected with the facilitation of highly uncertain
transactions. It facilitates the exchange of resources and transformation that
are essential for high performance, but are hard to value and transfer through
market easier (Uzzi 1996). Thirdly, trust carries information function (Gulati
1998). For example, search cost can be reduced via social networks of trust-
ing relationships between rms which can ally together (Gulati 1995). In this
example, trust is a substitute for contractual safeguards.
The indirect channels include the improved government performance through
which economic growth is boosted. Boix and Posner (1998) argue that social
capital is conducive to eective governance via facilitating the articulation of
citizens' demands. Furthermore, social capital creates costly mechanism of en-
forcements eectively securing compliance. Also, it reduces transaction costs in
the sphere of citizen-government relations since social capital forms the expec-
tations that citizens have about the behaviour of others. Finally, it increases
the probability of the articulation of collective demands that improve the wel-
fare for everyone. Boix and Posner conclude that social capital ultimately leads
to lower probability of individuals behaving opportunistically and as a conse-
quence, the resources can be invested elsewhere. Knack (2000) provides similar
reasoning. In his opinion, social capital inuences governmental performance
in three ways. Firstly, it broadens government accountability; high level of
trust and more civic-minded citizens improve governmental performance via in-
creasing the level and improving character of political participation, mainly by
enhancing public-interested behaviour and reducing rent-seeking activities. Sec-
ondly, it aects facilitation of agreement when political preferences are strongly
polarized. Greater social capital means that not only people trust each other
more, but it also entails better public spiritedness which can serve as glue
in the time of conict. Certainly when both parties have the public welfare
at heart and trust each other, they are more willing to compromise. The last
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point concerns innovation in policy making when society faces a new challenge.
Putnam et al. (1993) observe that more civic parts of Italy were able to deal
with newly formed problems better (i.e., family clinics). The reason for this
may be connected with the resistance to policy changes. Countries with low
social capital are plagued with distrust, low level of civic-mindedness and lack
of abilities to lead a meaningful dialogue. Most of the economists, however, aim
at approaching problem of trust more directly, in the form of growth regressions
by building on the concept of morality (Tabelllini 2008). Here we encounter a
methodological problem. Economists' arguments on why countries (societies)
with higher level of trust are more successful rely on micro-level arguments de-
rived from transaction cost theory and game theory (Glaeser et al. 2000), yet
analysis frequently takes place at macro-level. The jump from micro to macro-
level is not trivial. Moreover, it may be illegitimate because what may be true
for individuals, may not be true for the society as a whole (Fine 2001). Table
1 lists most common arguments in studies aiming at directly linking trust to
economic growth. To sum up, trust is deemed to increase the eciency of invest-
ment, physical and human capital, promote innovation and reduce transaction
costs and principal-agent problems.
Now, we turn our attention towards empirical ndings. The vast majority
of the studies use as a measure of trust a question from the World Values
Survey: Generally speaking, do you think that people can be trusted?(Knack
and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001). Respondents can either answer most
people can be trusted or can't be too careful. The result is then the percentage
of respondents in the country that chose most people can be trusted. Knack
and Keefer's (1997) article is the most inuential among of these macroeconomic
studies. The authors attempt to assess the importance of social capital with
respect to economic pay-o using a sample of 29 countries. They focus on
trust because they believe it is the most important aspect of social capital.
Their conclusion is that trust has a statistically signicant eect of economic
growth. The extension made by Zak and Knack (2001) analyzing trust-growth
relationship using 41 countries come to the same conclusion - trust (measured
using generally speaking question) has a positive and signicant impact on
economic growth.
Helliwell and Putnam (1995) analyzed regional growth dierentials in Italian
regions and found that social capital is positively related to growth. However,
their index of social capital does not include generalized trust, but it includes
civic community, institutional performance, and citizen satisfaction instead. On
the other hand, Schneider et al. (2000) carries out an analysis of trust based on
a sample of 58 European regions and nds a negative and signicant relationship
with growth. Casey (2004) reports that ranks of the trust scores fromWVS of 11
British regions coincide with the ranking of regional economic development. A
study done by Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik (2005a), in which they regress social
capital on economic growth using a sample of 44 European regions, points to
a positive and signicant eect. However, once Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik
(2005b) control for country-specic eects using more elaborate models and
apply robustness analysis, signicance of trust disappears. In a similar vein,
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Table 1: Theoretical arguments linking trust to economic growth (adopted from
Beugelsdijk and Maseland 2011)
1.High levels of trust reduce transaction costs, especially the contract and
control costs associated with economic transactions.
2. High levels of trust make a society less dependent on formal institutions, as
trust is an (imperfect) substitute for a legal system. Trust allows for low-cost
enforcement of contracts. This is especially the case in principalagent
settings when a principal has to trust the agent to deliver goods or services,
but cannot supervise the quality or eectiveness of their work (without
incurring high costs). Trust is an ecient enforcement mechanism. At the
aggregate level, trust is argued to reduce the levels of fraud and crime in a
society.
3. High levels of trust reduce the costs of defecting in prisoner dilemma
situations. Bilateral and multilateral reputation mechanisms lead to potential
punishment, such as loss of reputation and ostracism.
4. High levels of trust and social capital enable actors to solve
collective-action problems in an ecient way. Related to the transaction costs
argument, the Coase theorem is put forward as part of the explanation. The
Coase theorem holds that when transaction costs are low, actors will be able
to negotiate solutions to collective-action problems more eciently than could
be achieved by outside regulation (Whiteley 2000; Coase 1990).
5. High levels of trust trigger investment because trust is associated with
long-time horizons benecial for risky investments. According to some
authors (e.g. Whiteley 2000), high levels of trust are associated with low
levels of risk averseness, which will be benecial for innovative investments.
Empirical evidence for this argument is lacking, however.
6. High levels of trust make investments in education more ecient because
the returns on the accumulation of human capital are assumed to be higher
(cf. Bjørnskov 2009). According to Whiteley (2000: 451), educational
investment may not work eectively in a low trust society if employment
practices are strongly inuenced by ascriptive criteria such as kinship and
ethnicity.
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Akcomak and Ter Weel (2009) investigate an interplay between social capital,
innovation and per capita income growth in 102 European regions between 1990
and 2002. They test the hypothesis that social capital indirectly aects per
capita income growth through innovation. The results suggest that social capital
fosters innovation which in turn positively inuences growth. Furthermore, the
estimates provide no evidence of direct eect of social capital on per capita
income growth.
To summarize, the regional-level studies do not yield unambiguous positive
and signicant eects of trust on economic growth (Beugelsdijk and Maseland
2011). Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) set out to perform robustness analysis building
upon dataset used in Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001). They
found that trust in the sample of 29 original countries is signicant only in 4.5%
models. Interestingly, adding the 12 mostly less developed countries, increased
the signicance of trust and the eect size doubled. The results of this study
imply that the sample structure drives the importance of trust. A subsequent
study by Ahlerup et al. (2009) which takes into account endogeneity of trust
and institutions, conrms the hypothesis that the marginal eect of trust on
growth increases with lower quality of institutions. They interpret this nding
as evidence that trust is non-linear. Horváth (2013) employs BMA together with
2SLS to assess whether trust is a salient determinant of growth. The results
conrms the importance of trust for growth as well as the substitution eect
between trust and institutions.
Research on trust (and social capital) is not free from criticism. Trust is
related to institutions and this leads to an identication problem. Positive and
signicant correlation of 0.627 between generalized trust and trust in institutions
is reported by Van Oorschot et al. (2006). Berggren and Jordahl (2006) nd a
positive correlation of 0.58 between aggregate trust and the Economic Freedom
Index.
Common practice in case we deal with endogenous variables is the use of
intrumental variables. An instrumental variable has to meet two criteria: (a)
it must be correlated with endogenous variable and (b) it must be uncorrelated
with the error term in the second stage equation. Point (a) can be easily veried,
(b) is causing much trouble. Typical instrumental variables that have been used
are Tabellini's (2008) literacy rates and historical political institutions, Knack
and Keefer's (1997) ethinc/linguistic homogeneity or common religion used by
Guiso et al. (2009). These variables have one common feature: there are also
plausible arguments claiming that these variables violate the point (b), in other
words: they are not exogenous to the error term beyond doubt (Fehr 2009).
Some studies take sub-national route. By analyzing the impact of trust at
lower level, country-specic institutions are controlled for. Additionally, regions
are relatively homogenous compared to country studies that include countries
with diverse cultures like Germany and Japan in the same regression. This is
relevant because countries may dier in terms of relevant proxies for culture
(social capital). Lastly, usually country itself is diverse thus, we are losing
country specic features.
As we already said, regional studies frequently nd trust to be negative or
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insignicant, and signicance of trust in country-level regressions depends on
the underlying sample, specically on the inclusion of least developed economies.
Therefore, we need to ask what trust, as it has been used in the literature,
reects. It can simply be a proxy for institutional quality. Nevertheless, we can
be sure that an identication problem exists.
Validity is another methodological problem that plagues trust research. Us-
laner (2002) argues that the ordering of responses inuences how respondents
answer the question about trust. Furthermore, the real meaning of the answers
has been questioned (Moore 1999). Putnam (2000) claims that the meanings
of the responses are unclear. He argues that people reporting most people can
be trusted can mean any of three things:  1) other people's behaviour has
not really changed, but we have become more paranoid; 2) the respondents are
actually reporting that honesty is rare these days; or 3) neither our ethical de-
mands nor other people's behaviour have actually changed, but now we have
more information about their treachery, perhaps because of more lurid media
reports. Aditionally, there is a debate over what is meant by most people
(Delhey and Newton 2005). Miller and Mitamura (2003) elaborate on the va-
lidity of WVS trust question. Essentially, they claim that the question does not
constitute one scale. It is composed of two discrete items, trust and caution,
instead of more ideal trust and distrust. The issue is that trust and caution
are not opposite to each other. The authors carry out an experiment consisting
of Japanese and American students showing that when caution is not included
and trust is measured on a seperate scale, the US students are more trusting
than Japanese students. By contrast, in WVS from 1997 Japan has higher lev-
els of trust (43%) than America (36%). Miller and Mitamura's (2003) ndings
suggests that generally speaking question lacks internal validity and is biased.
Next issue we are going to discuss is level problems. The problem lies in the
fact that micro-level insights regarding transaction costs are used as arguments
in trust-growth studies. Empirical studies use a dierent measure of trust. As
we already mentioned, at the macro-level trust is measured using WVS ques-
tion. On the other hand, micro-level trust has been measured in several ways.
Frequently it is operationalized through a multi-item scale composed of ques-
tions that respondents are asked when discussing specic partners or individuals
(Gamesam 1994; Brock Smith and Barclay 1997). Beugelsdijk (2006) compares
micro and macro measures of trust and concludes that rm-level trust is not
trust of the macroeconomic literature. Because we have a trusting relationship
does not mean that the reduction of transaction costs can be simply transformed
into the statement that high interpersonal trust reduced transaction costs in an
economy, which in turn positively aects GDP (Fine 2001).
Lastly, Kirkman et al. (2009) argue that cultural variables may have much
stronger eects under certain conditions. We could improve our understanding
by establishing the boundary conditions for cultural value eects. This would
improve the understanding and interpreting study ndings and help to deter-
mine the conditions under which cultural values are likely to have more mean-
ingful inuences on organizationally relevant outcomes (Taras et al. 2010).
The importance of trust in current literature cannot be stressed enough. We
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devote a considerable amount of attention to trust-growth studies because many
methodological pitfalls apply to other cultural traits we are about to discuss.
For the sake of brevity, we are going to review only the cultural traits that have
received a lot of attention in economics and are highly relevant for our topic.
Individualism versus Collectivism
Cross-cultural psychologists consider individualism vs. collectivism the main
dimension of cultural variation (Heine 2008). Several contributions (Greif 1996,
2006; Gorodnichenko and Roland 2013) nd considerable support for this do-
main. Individualism highlights the importance of personal freedom, self-realization
and achievements. Therefore, culture of individualism awards social status to
personal accomplishments such as scientic discoveries. It also brings disadvan-
tages. More individualistic societies make collective actions harder to realize
since everybody pursue his/her interests without internalizing collective inter-
ests. Collectivistic societies on the other hand, perform collective action easier
because members of society are able to internalize group interests better, but
by encouraging conformity, they discourage innovation. Gorodnichenko and
Roland (2013) construct an endogenous growth model which uses Hofstede's
individualism as the main cultural variable. They use genetic distance as an
instrumental variable to deal with endogeneity and nd a robust causal eect of
individualism on innovation, income per worker and total factor productivity.
Pronoun drop has been used as an instrument for Hofstede's individual-
ism by Gorodnichenko and Roland (2013). The relationship between culture
and language has been an important issue for anthropology and psychology
since Sapir-Whorf hypothesis which postulates that language determinates, or
at least inuences, the way perceive our world (Sapir 1970; Whorf 1956). There
is abundant literature arguing that cognitive processes aect our language use,
but language also determines our higher order cognitive processes, for example,
value judgments or social inferences, by virtue of its inherent involvement in the
process of obtaining cultural practices (Kashima and Kashima 1998). They link
the obligation of pronoun use in language to the degree of psychological dier-
entiation between the speaker and the social context of speech. For instance,
languages like English have to use subject pronouns (I, you) even though
the referent is unambiguous. This signals that the referent is highlighted as a
gure against the context. On the other hand, languages such as Japanese or
Korean license to drop pronouns and so the conceptual dierentiation between
person and context is reduced. Therefore, the speaker blends in the context (is
being contextualized) when he or she drops pronoun and his or her uniqueness
decreases. To clarify, contextualization is meant in a narrow sense - the self is
not the focus of conceptual attention. Kashima and Kashima (1998) evaluated
pronoun use in 39 languages in 71 countries. The authors coded whether or not
grammatical rules allowed for pronoun drop and it turned out that Hofstede's
individualism is negatively correlated, and Schwartz's autonomy is positively
correlated with their constructed variable. Thus, countries that score low on
Hofstede's individualism are expected to have a licensed pronoun drop. There-
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fore, the pronoun drop variable makes a good candidate for an instrumental
variable in cultural studies. It is suciently relevant for culture and at the
same time it is likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction.
Interestingly, individualism-collectivism dimension has received the most at-
tention from cross-cultural organizational behaviour and psychology literature
(Taras et al. 2010). The research concluded that there has been an overreliance
on this dimension compared to Hofstede's other cultural dimensions. Individu-
alism domain has also been widely criticized for its fuzzy denition (Earley and
Gibson 1998).
Family Ties
Baneld (1985) and Coleman (1990) analyze dierent cultural traits related
to family values. Both observe that societies that have strong ties between family
members tend to promote codes of good conduct within a small circle of related
individuals. In such societies, selsh behaviour is deemed to be acceptable
outside of the small network. On the other hand, societies that family ties are
less important promote codes of good conduct outside the family and therefore,
such society is more able to identify itself with a society of abstract individuals.
A great deal of attention to family ties has been devoted by Alesina and Giu-
liano (2010; 2011; 2013). They measure family ties using three WVS questions
(see data section for details). In their analyses, a variety of outcomes are investi-
gated such as political participation, labor-force participation of women, young
adults and the elderly, measures of generalized trust, geographical mobility, and
household production. Essential ndings are that societies based on strong fam-
ily ties have lower levels of generalized trust and lower civic sense. Moreover,
home production, prevalently done by women, youngsters and elderly, tend to
be higher according to the male breadwinner hypothesis. Besides the three
question used by Alesina and Giuliano, objective measures such as frequency
of contact among family members or how close/far away children live to their
parents can be used. For example, in southern Europe, approximately 70% of
children live less than 5 kilometers from their parents' house, while in Denmark
the number is much lower - 30% (Alesina et al. 2015).
Bertrand and Schoar (2006) show that in countries where family ties are
strong, family capitalism is more frequent. They show that this industrial struc-
ture is not optimal; nepotism in hiring decreases the average quality of the rm.
Moreover, managers, who are family members, tend to be more risk-averse.
Lastly, family rms tend to stay smaller.
Forms of family structures inuence the resistance to or diusion of so-
cial changes in Europe such as secularism, Protestantism and the acceptance
and diusion of communism (Tod 1985, 1990). The author describes family
types along two dimensions: horizontal and vertical. The horizontal relation-
ship (among siblings) is either egalitarian, or non-egalitarian. That is siblings
receive an equal share of family wealth after their parents die, or one of the
siblings is favoured and receives all the family's wealth. The vertical relation-
ship (between parents and children) is either liberal or authoritarian. That is
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children gain independence at an early age and move out as soon as they get
married, or continue staying at home even after marrying.
When we combine Todd's dimensions we obtain 4 possible types of family
organization: 1) the stem family (authoritarian + non-egalitarian), 2) the com-
munitarian family (authoritarian + egalitarian), 3) the absolute nuclear family
(liberal + non-egalitarian), 4) the egalitarian nuclear family (liberal + egalitar-
ian).
An application of Todd's classication of families in Duranton et al. (2009)
explains regional disparities across Europe in educational attainment, social
capital, household sizes, labour participation, sectoral structure, inequality, and
wealth. Galasso and Profeta (2012) using Todd's classication show that fam-
ily structures are essential for explaining dierent types of pension systems.
Moreover, they show that Todd's denition of nuclear and extended family is
correlated with the family ties measured using 3 WVS questions in Alesina and
Giulano (2010).
Generalized Morality
Tabellini (2008, 2010) explores generalized versus limited morality in relation
to economic development. In hierarchical societies, codes of good conduct and
sincere behaviour are frequently conned to members of the family or to the
clan. Outside of this small circle, behaviour is characterized by opportunism and
selshness is regarded as natural and morally acceptable. Generalized morality,
on the contrary, is characterized by cooperative behaviour towards everyone in
society. This idea originally comes from Platteau (2000). In modern democratic
societies, the rules of good conduct apply to many social situations. Tabellini
combines question from WVS and by using principal component analysis, he
creates generalized morality variable (more details are provided in the next
section). This variable is included in growth regression of European regions
and instrumented by the literacy rate at the end of the XIXth century, and
the historical political institutions to isolate exogenous variation. The results
support the view that generalized morality plays a role in economic development.
Attitudes Towards Work and the perception of poverty
The famous work of Max Weber, Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Cap-
italism, relies on this trait. According to Weber, the Protestant revolution
supported a dierent attitude toward hard work, accumulation of wealth and
success in the current life compared to Catholic doctrine which was predominant
in Europe. Recently, research has stressed dierent views regarding the role of
hard work. For some people, hard work is a gate to success and a better life,
a possibility for many, leading to higher social mobility. Others believe that to
succeed in life, one needs luck and personal connections. Alesina and Glaeser
(2004) argue that these view deeply rooted and change very slowly. Several con-
tributions have shown that beliefs about the income-generating process might
be fundamental in determining structure of economic organization (Benabou
and Ok, 2001; Benabou and Tirole 2006; Di Tella et al. 2007).
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Related to views about hard work are perceptions about poverty. A ques-
tion from WVS asks whether respondents believe that the poor could become
rich if they made enough eort. We can interpret this statement as a moral
judgment about the poor - are they lazy or do they have bad luck? Alesina
and Glaeser (2004) explore the dierence between Europeans and Americans
regarding attitudes toward the poor. They point to dierences in generosity of
the respective welfare states. Moreover, they highlight an interesting observa-
tion - the poor are viewed with less sympathy when they belong to a linguistic
or religious minority.
Views on the appropriate role of women in society
Alesina et al. (2013) examine the historical origins of current dierences
in views regarding the appropriate role of women in society. They set out to
test the hypothesis whether technology, namely the use of plough in agriculture
during pre-industrial time, inuenced the historical gender division of labour
and subsequently the evolution of gender norms. They nd that societies that
used plough in the past today have more unequal gender norms measured using
two questions from WVS (see data section), female labour participation, par-
ticipation in politics and entrepreneurship. Their results are consistent across
country-level, district level, and ethnicity-level. Another interesting example of
how dierences in technology can inuence norms has been shown by Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2013). They build a model where altruistic parents exercise a
direct socializing eort on their daughters. This comes at a cost that rationalizes
how technological advancement in contraception leads to a greater occurrence
of premarital sex and to a shift in sexual mores.
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4 Data
Our dataset includes: (i) average of log GDP per worker between 1996 and 2000;
(ii) cultural variables (4) (variables of interest); (iii) instrumental variables (5);
(iv) control variables.
Countries (46) in the sample include: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Aus-
tralia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ger-
many, Hungary, Chile, China, India, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, Ukraine, the United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.
4.1 Variables of Interest
We analyze four cultural variables from World Values Survey.
We measure the relevance of family ties in society using three questions,
following Alesina and Giuliano (2010). The rst question asks a respondent
how important family is in his/her life. The second and the third question let
respondent choose between two statements: Regardless of what the qualities
and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them versus
One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned
it by their behavior and attitudes, and Parents' duty is to do their best for
their children even at the expense of their own well-being versus Parents have
a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrice their own well-being for
the sake of their children. We take the sum of all of them. Given the way the
variables are coded, higher value corresponds to stronger family ties.
Another cultural value that we include in our analysis is concerned with
views regarding the role of women in society. Based on Alesina et al. (2013)
we select two questions (statements) from WVS: When jobs are scarce, men
should have more right to a job than women (agree or disagree), and On the
whole, men make better political leaders than women do (strongly agree, agree,
disagree, strongly disagree). Similarly to family ties, we sum up both questions.
Higher number corresponds to a greater degree of discrimination of women.
The third variable of interest is generalized morality. We follow Tabellini
(2010) and take four questions from WVS as a proxy for generalized morality.
They are: trust, tolerance and respect for other people, obedience, and feel-
ing of control over own life. Trust is measured asking the following question:
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you can't be too careful in dealing with people?. For tolerance and respect,
and obedience respondents are asked to choose ve qualities that deem to be
important for children to learn at home from a list containing eleven options.
The last variable, control over own life, is measured asking: Some people feel
they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people
feel that what we do has no real eect on 10 what happens to them. Please use
this scale (from 1 to 10) where 1 means none at all and 10 means a great deal
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to indicate how much freedom of choice and control in life you have over the
way your life turns out. We use the following formula to aggregate the ques-
tions into one variable: gm = trust+ control+ tolerance& respect−obedience.
Higher value implies greater level of generalized morality.
The last variable taken from WVS is related to the perception of whether
hard work pays o or not. Specically, respondents are asked to choose between
two statements on a scale from 1 to 10: In the long run, hard work usually
brings a better life versus Hard work does not generally brings success - it is




Genetic distance received a great deal of attention in economics. Guiso et
al. (2009) see it as a proxy for both genetic and cultural dissimilarity which is
an origin of a potential bias altering people's propensity to trust each other and
engage in trade. A dierent view holds Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). They ar-
gue that genetic distance can be seen as a barrier to the diusion of technologies
because people that are more distant from each other tend to communicate less
and thus benet less from technological innovation. Bisin and Verdier (2000,
2001), among others, argue that the major determinant of the individual' cul-
tural values is the parental transmission of culture. It is clear that parents pass
on their cultural values and their genes to their children. Populations that inter-
breed frequently ought to be genetically close as well as culturally close due to a
very similar parental transmission mechanism. These facts constitute grounds
for usage of genetic distance as a proxy measure of dierences in parental trans-
mission of cultural values. As far as we know, there are no proofs of genetic
distance causing some countries to become wealthier than others. Therefore, it
is likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction.
One way genetic distance is measured was developed by Cavalli Sfroza et
al. (1994). It is based on DNA polymorphism (an occurrence in which a gene
or a DNA sequence exists in two or more dierent forms [alleles]). Division
of blood groups into A, B and O is an example of polymorphism. While all
populations have A, B, O alleles, frequency of these forms substantially dier
across populations. For instance, the O allele is present in 98% of American
Natives populations, but only 61% of African populations. Other genes have
similar frequency variations as ABO alleles do. Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994)
derive a measure of the dierences in the genetic composition of two populations
by summing the dierences in frequencies of these polymorphisms which serves
as a rst approximation.
We use data from Gorodnichenko and Roland (2013) who use only neutral
genetic markers which do not have any direct eect on genetic tness as an
instrumental variable for culture. Using ethnic shares of Fearon (2003) and
their data, the authors aggregate genetic data from more than 2 000 groups
of population and construct country-level data. The benchmark country is the
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USA which is the most individualistic country in their sample. Also, Spolaore
and Wacziarg (2009) construct genetic distance data including a broader set of
genes, but the number of groups is only 42.
Index of Historical Prevalence of Infectious Diseases
Historical prevalence of infectious diseases is our another instrumental vari-
able. Some evidence points to regional variation in infectious diseases as an
important factor in explaining the origin of various kinds of cross-cultural dif-
ferences. For example, diseases correlate with dierences in mating structures
(Low 1990) and parenting practices (Quinlan 2007). Finchers et al. (2008) claim
that higher pathogen prevalence forced communities to adopt more collectivist
values highlighting tradition, putting stronger limits on individual behaviour
and exhibiting less openness towards foreigners.
To allow for testing such hypothesis at country-level, Murray and Schaller
(2010) develop an index of historical prevalence of infectious diseases within 230
geopolitical regions. The index includes 9 diseases: trypanosomes, leishmanias,
schistosomes, leprosy, malaria, typhus, lariae, tuberculosis and dengue. The
authors used epidemiological atlases to estimate the prevalence of each disease
in each region.
Historical Plough Use
Ester Boserup (1970) develops the hypothesis that dierences in gender roles
can be explained by looking at a form of agriculture traditionally practiced be-
fore industrialization took place. The author determines important dierences
between plough cultivation and shifting cultivation. The latter is labour inten-
sive and requires a use of handheld tools like the digging stick or the hoe. On
the contrary, plough cultivation is capital intensive and requires much of upper
body strength, grip strength, and bursts of power to eectively pull the plough
or control the animal that pulls it. Therefore, plough culture puts men in an
advantageous position in farming relative to women. Since soil preparation is
of high importance in agriculture (accounts for one-third of the total time), so-
cieties practicing plough agriculture established a specialization of production
along gender lines. As one would expect, men worked outside the home while
women did tasks around the house. Such division of labour subsequently created
norms about the appropriate role of women in society. Societies that tradition-
ally used plough agriculture developed the belief that the natural role for women
is at home. These beliefs persist for a long time, even after the economy moves
out of agriculture, aecting the participation of women in activities performed
outside the home. Alesina et al. (2013) test this hypothesis using pre-industrial
ethnographic data, contemporary measures of individuals' beliefs about gender
roles, and measures of female participation in activities outside the home at
country, ethnic and individual level. Controlling for various factors, the authors
nd strong support for Boserup's hypothesis.
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Legal Origin
The idea that legal origin could serve as an instrumental variable for insti-
tutions belongs to La Porta et al. (1998). If we simplify the concept enough,
we can say that there are two legal origin traditions - one is common law, which
originated in England, and the second is civil law upon which French, Ger-
man and Scandinavian legal systems are based. The French civil code of 1804
is meant to be accessible to the general population and was formed by legal
scholars. Napoleon saw the importance of exporting French civil law to other
countries and made it one of his priorities. Consequently, civil law made an im-
pact in numerous countries including Italy, Poland, Northern and Sub-Saharan
Africa or Indochina. Additionally, French legal tradition had a major inuence
on Spanish and Portuguese legal systems, which contributed to proliferation of
French law to Central and South America. German civil code appeared at the
and of the 19th century and spread its inuence to Switzerland, Austria, China,
Yugoslavia, Greece, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Since England, Germany
and France spread its legal systems primarily through conquest and imperial-
ism, historical legal origins are deemed to be to a large extent exogenous.
Instrument for Trade
Frankel and Romer (1999) constructed predicted trade/GDP shares on the
basis of gravity equation. The authors rst regress bilateral trade ows on dis-
tance between the trade partners, country mass and several other geographical
variables, and then computing a predicted aggregate trade share for every coun-
try based on the estimated coecients. The obtained predicted trade share is




Geography received a great deal of attention in economics and is deemed
to be one of major driving factors behind economic development. There are
numerous studies aiming at linking geographic characteristics to economic de-
velopment such as the climate (Kamarck 1976, Masters and McMillan 2001),
terrain ruggedness (Nunn and Puga 2009), natural openness (Rappaport and
Sachs 2003), and resource endowment (Sachs and Warner 2001). Geography
also inuences human actions in the past as well as today. Even seemingly neg-
ligible geographic dierences may have a large impact on economic development.
For instance, the varying conditions in soil and climate made plantation agri-
culture and its dependence on slavery more or less lucrative in dierent parts
of the United States (Engerman and Sokolo 2002). Gallup et al. (1998) call
for a re-introduction of geography into the econometrics and theoretical studies
of cross-country economic growth. The authors provide several geographical
variables they deem to be important for economic development: (i) Tropical
climate - hinders growth probably due to higher disease burden and limitations
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on agricultural activity. (ii) Coastal regions have a big advantage over hinter-
lands. (iii) Landlocked countries seem to be particularly disadvantaged, mainly
because cross-border of labor is more dicult than internal migration; infras-
tructure development across national borders is much more dicult to arrange
than similar investments within a country, and coastal countries may have mil-
itary or economic incentives to impose costs on interior landlocked countries.
(iv) High population density seems to be conducive for growth in coastal areas
that have good access to internal, regional and international trade. (v) pop-
ulation growth across economies in the recent past is strongly and negatively
correlated with their relative potential for economic growth.
Hence, we include several geographical variables in our analysis. One of
them is taken from Masters and McMillan (2001) who construct a variable that
attempts to measure the prevalence of seasonal frosts, hypothesizing that ab-
sence of winter frost plays an important role in explaining economic growth.
They argue that ground frost has two positive eects. Firstly, it inuences hu-
man health via selectively killing exposed organisms that help people control the
transmission of disease. This leads to a reduction of morbidity and mortality
rates, and uncertainty, consequently promoting the accumulation of human cap-
ital. Secondly, ground frost mitigates proliferation of plant and animal diseases,
and facilitating the accumulation of deeper and richer topsoils by controlling the
organisms that mineralize soil organic matter. One of the undeniable positives
of ground frosts is its unambitious exogeneity, unlike other indicators of bio-
logical activity such as soils or vegetation which are heavily inuenced human
investment even in the prehistoric times. Their cross-country growth regres-
sions conrm their hypothesis, and they select a threshold for ground frost of
ve days per month in winter.
Terrain ruggedness is another important factor. Nunn and Puga (2009)
construct a measure of terrain ruggedness and include it in cross-country re-
gressions. There are two channels through which it inuences economic devel-
opment. The negative eects of rugged terrain on economic outcomes are well
established. Cultivation becomes dicult, steep slopes create erosion, and the
control of water is much more complicated. The Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization (1993) reports that for slopes greater than 2 degrees, the benets of
cultivation usually do not cover necessary costs, and for slopes greater than 6
degrees, cultivation is not feasible. Moreover, since earthwork costs are higher,
building costs are much greater when terrain is uneven (Rapaport and Snickars
1999; Nogales et al. 2002). Another drawback of uneven terrain is slow and ex-
pensive transportation. An interesting study by Allen, et al. (2005) highlights
these eects of uneven terrain in Papua New Guinea. They document that steep
terrain renders the production of cash crops very demanding and it also makes
it much more expensive or sometimes impossible to transport the crops to the
markets. As a consequence, inhabitants living in these parts have poorer health
and lower income. On the other hand, Nunn and Puga (2009) argue that terrain
ruggedness had positive eects during the slave trades. Populations were able
to hide in caves or watch the lowlands and incoming paths in order to protect
themselves against raids and kidnapping which were the most common methods
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of enslavement. The authors nd a support for both channels.
Other Control Variables
Besides the variables mentioned above, we include several more regressors
in our analysis. The importance of institutions is well established (North 1990;
Knack and Keefer 1995; Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2001; Rodrik et
al. 2004). Institutions are regarded as a fundamental cause of economic growth
and are commonly dened as rules of the game in society or more formally as
the humanly devides constraints that shape human interaction (North 1990).
We use World Governance Indicators as a proxy for institutions. Because we
have six indicators of institutional quality and only one instrument, we use
principal component analysis and extract the rst component and use it in the
regression equation. Trade represents another important driver of economic de-
velopment (see, for example, Sachs and Warner 1995). We include trade as a
share of GDP in our analysis. The rest of the control variables are: absolute
latitude and longitude, jurisdictional hierarchy beyond local community, trop-
ical climate, economic complexity, average temperature, average precipitation,
communism dummy, distance from the UK, landlock dummy, hemisphere dum-
mies, island dummy, length of coastline, proportion of population within 100km
of the coastline, presence of large domesticated animals, soil depth, practice
of intensive agriculture, patrilocal society, extended family. Details including
sources can be found in the appendix.
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5 Bayesian Model Averaging
BMA has experienced an increase of popularity in economics literature over
the last two decades thanks to the computational advances. BMA is commonly
used to deal transparently and rigorously with the problem of model uncertainty.
In the eld of growth economics which has developed many competing theories
over years, model averaging can be of a tremendous help.
Fernández et al. (2001) contributed to popularization of BMA in economics.
The authors use BMA on a dataset containing forty one regressors which yield
over two trillion possible models (241).
Bayesian econometrics is built on a few rules of probability. Assume we
have two random variables, X and Y. From equating p(X,Y ) = p(X|Y ) p(Y )
and p(Y,X) = p(Y |X) p(X) we acquire Bayes' rule that lies at the core of
Bayesian econometrics:
p(Y |X) = p(X|Y ) p(Y )
p(X)
(1)
Let Ml denote l dierent models. Every model depends on a vector of





where p(y|θl,Ml) is the likelihood function, p(θl|Ml) is the prior density and
p(θl|y,Ml) is referred to as the posterior density. The prior, p(θl|Ml), is not
dependent on the data. It summarizes what the researcher knows about θ prior
to seeing the data. In growth econometrics, there are not any beliefs or infor-
mation which are common or shared among researchers, thus noninformative
priors are used in most cases. Common practice is to assign the prior a low
importance, so it plays little role in posterior formula.
The likelihood function, p(y|θl,Ml), is the density of the data, it is called
the data generating process.
The posterior, p(θl|y,Ml), is of fundamental interest. It says how much we
know about θl, given the data.





where p(Ml|y) is referred to as posterior model probability. It allows for
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ranking of models and model comparison.
Now lets us consider a dataset with a dependent variable Y with n obser-
vations and a set of k regressors X1.....Xk. We would like to identify which
regressors are robust determinants of our dependent variable. In frequentist
econometrics, a common approach is to specify a set of the core regressors (core
model) and then to assess robustness by adding additional regressors. However,
the procedure is non-transparent and faces problems from a decision-theoretic
perspective. When using BMA, number of explanatory variables is limited only
by number of observations. Therefore, by using BMA we can include many
more regressors, reduce model uncertainty and omitted variable bias.
Assume that the we are interested in the eect of, for example, trade on
economic growth. To assess its robustness when theory or empirical research
suggests that there are many potential determinants of economic growth and,
therefore, numerous models ( for k regressors we have 2k = l dierent models)
may be problematic with frequentist methods. But within BMA framework, it
is a straightforward task. Let ω be a vector of parameters which has a common
interpretation across all models. In our case, we are interested in trade coecient
so ω is that coecient in every regression. What Bayesian econometrics says






The above formula says that to obtain information about ω, we estimate ev-
ery model (p(ω|y,Ml)) and average them where weights are the posterior model
probabilities p(Ml|y). This way, one can obtain the posterior inclusion proba-
bility which tells us what is the probability that a given regressor belongs to the
true model. In (4), M1, . . . , Ml are dierent models under consideration.









is the integrated likelihood of model Ml, θlis the vector of parameters of
model Ml, p(θl|Ml) is the prior density of θl under model Ml, p(y|θl,Ml) is
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the likelihood, and p(Ml) is the prior probability that Ml is the true model,
assuming that one of the model under consideration is true.
Since our econometric specication (see the next section) includes many en-
dogenous variables, we need to use instrumental variable procedure. We use
Instrumental Variable Bayesian Model Averaging technique developed by Karl
and Lenkoski (2012). Koop et al. (2012) and Eicher et al. (2012) also developed
a framework that is able to deal with endogeneity within BMA framework. How-
ever, Karl and Lenkoski's (2012) framework is straightfroward to implement and
has limited issues regarding mixing compared to other methods. Unfortunately,
only UIP parameter prior with uniform model prior is available.
6 Econometric specication and results
Our goal is to assess the impact of the selected cultural traits on economic
growth. While there is no doubt that there exists a relationship between cul-
ture and growth, we want to show that this relationship is a causal one. Robert
Inglehart in his book Modernization and Postmodernization makes a proposi-
tion that eventually all societies wil converge in their development to the point
of diminshing returns, which forms the motivation toward other goals such as
friendship or the importance of self-expression. That is members of society be-
come wealthy and educated enough to move their attention to other aspects of
human life. To rule out the possibility that economic development determines
culture, we employ instrumental variable procedure. Thus, our model looks like:
Y = α+ βW + ϕX ++ε
W = δ + θZ + η
where Y is logarithm of GDP per worker between 1996 and 2000, X is a set
of exogenous variables, W is a set of endogenous variables (trade, family ties,
generalized morality, views about the role of women), Z is a set of instruments
(predicted trade shares, historical pathogen prevalence, genetic distance, plough
use), and ε, η are an error terms. We focus on levels of income instead of growth
rates asthis approach has been widely criticized (Easterly et al. 1993; Hall and
Jones 1999).
As we said earlier, we instrument trade, which is measured as a sum of ex-
ports plus imports divided by GDP, with predicted trade shares using gravity
equation as it is described in Frankel and Romer (1999). Institutions are instru-
mented with legal origin, which is a dummy variable taking value one if country
has common law system, and 0 for civil law system. Legal origin is argued to
be a large extent exogenous to growth because it was imposed on countries by
imperialism and conquest.
Next, we instrument generalized morality with genetic distance. We inter-
pret genetic distance as a proxy for cultural (transmission of cultural values
from parents to children) and genetic dissimilarity. Therefore, societies that
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are genetically distant tend to trust each other less, and cooperative behaviour,
which is charateristic for generalized morality, breaks down.
Another endogenous variable is family ties which is instrumented with the
index of historical prevalence of infectious diseases. Even though cross-country
dierences in family ties have most likely long historical roots, we formally
address potential issue of causality. Higher pathogen prevalence pushes societies
to be less open, put stronger limits on individual behaviour and to embrace
tradition. Thus, we expect higher pathogen prevalence to be postively related
to family ties.
Finally, views about the appropriate role of women in the society is instru-
mented with historical plough use. Alesina et al. (2013) test hypothesis that
dierences in gender roles can be explained by looking at a form of agriculture
traditionally practiced before industrialization took place. They nd consider-
able support for the hypothesis using several measures of women participation
in society including two questions from WVS, which we use in our analysis.
Table 2. presents the results of the second-stage regression. Tables 3. and
4. show the results of rst-stage regressions. Variables are ordered according
to its type: the rst are endogenous and then exogenous variables. In the rst
column is PIP (posterior inclusion probability), in the second column is posterior
mean. Family ties variable scores the highest among the cultural variables - its
PIP is 0.66, and its mean is positive. Given the way the variable is coded,
higher number implies stronger family ties. Thus, this nding suggests that
countries with stronger family ties enjoy greater economic growth. There is
no clear answer to the expected sign of the mean because literature lists both
positive and negative eects of family ties on economic outcomes ( Coleman
1990; Bertrand and Schoar 2006; Alesina and Giuliano 2010). Other variables
of interest have its PIPs below 0.5.
Surprisingly, views about the role of women received almost 0 probability.
It is possible that the questions used to create the variable do not capture
this cultural trait very well. Also, one would expect that the sign would be
negative (i.e. greater discrimination of women leads to lower GDP growth).
In the next subsection, we try to address the rst issue by including another
question from WVS, and the second issue by removing Japan and Korea from
our sample because these countries experienced spectacular economic growth,
yet are known for being patriarchal societies.
No less surprising is PIP of generalized morality. Given the support of
theoretical and empirical literature (Platteau 2000; Tabellini 2008, 2010), PIP of
generalized morality of 0.19 is very low. As we said in Section 3, the importance
of trust is dependent on sample structure. Eicher et al. (2007) show that the
determinants of growth dier sharply for the OECD and non-OECD countries.
Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008) show that the determinants in Africa dier
from those in the rest of the world. Trust is more important for countries with
low quality institutions (i.e. African countries). This may be true for generalized
morality as well (our sample includes only two African countries). Lastly, PIP
for hard work is 0.3 and has a positive sign as expected. In the next subsection,
we add another two items that ask about attitudes toward work.
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Besides cultural variables, we include in our analysis trade, institutions, ge-
ographical variables, agricultural and historical variables. Trade has a positive
sign and the highest PIP among all endogenous regressors - 0.79. This nd-
ing conrms the importance of trade for economic development which is in line
with Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Eicher et al. (2012), among others. By con-
trast, posterior inclusion probability is only 0.2 for institutional quality variable.
There are arguments in favour of institutions (North 1990; Acemoglu et al. 2001;
Rodrik et al. 2004; Acemoglu et al. 2004) as well as against them (Glaeser et
al. 2004; McCloskey 2010). Gorodnichenko and Roland (2013) investigate the
importance of Hofstede's individualism on economic development and show a
specication where institutions are insignicant at any conventional level. The
recent literature suggests that the interplay of culture and institutions should
be analyzed (Acemoglu and Jackson 2012; Guiso et al. 2013; Bowles and Gin-
tis 2010), i.e., institutions can matter more or less under certain conditions.
Interestingly, index of pathogen prevalence seems to be much stronger instru-
ment than legal origins. Higher pathogen prevalence implies lower institutional
quality which is in line with the argument of Acemoglu et al. (2001).
Two additional variables stand out. The rst is frost.days5 with PIP of
0.92. Masters and McMillan (2001) argue that ground frost may play a crucial
role in development: ground frost plays a role in human health, by selectively
killing exposed organisms that help people control the transmission of disease.
This, in turn, reduces morbidity, mortality, and uncertainty, hence promoting
the accumulation of human capital [Bloom and Sachs 1998]. Frost also plays
an important role in agriculture, by helping people control plant and animal
diseases [Kellman and Tackaberry 1997], and also facilitating the build-up of
deeper and richer topsoils by controlling the organisms that mineralize soil or-
ganic matter [van Wambeke 1992]. The second is soil depth with PIP of 0.7.
Clearly, the deeper the soil is, the easier is to cultivate crops and farmers have
a wider choice of plants since some are not suitable to be grown in shallow or
rocky soil. The importance of ground frost and soil depth gives support to pro-
ponents of geography (Diamond 1997, Sachs 2001) who argue that geography is
at the center of the story of the economic development.
6.1 Alternative specications
As we said in the previous subsection, we would modify some of our variables
by adding additional items from WVS. Firstly, we modify women variable by
adding the following item: A university education is more important for a boy
than for a girl. Table 5. presents the results of this modication. We can
see that the results are more or less the same. Institutions, trade, family ties
and generalized morality have somewhat slightly higher PIP while hard work's
PIP decreased. Also, the removal of Japan and Korea from the sample does
not change the sign of women variable (not reported). The reason for its
relative unimportance might be due to measurement error (Alesina et al. 2013
themselves claim that the variable is measured in a very narrow sense) or weak
instrument.
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Figure 1: Task vs. Hard Work
Next, we add two items from WVS to hard work variable. They are: Here
is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if
any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to ve. And:
I almost always continue to work on a task until I am satised with the result.
We sum all the items into one variable. The way the items are coded, the higher
number corresponds to more positive attitudes toward work. Table 8. shows
the results of second stage regression. Here, a dierent picture emerges. While
views about the appropriate role of women variable does not change, family ties
drop to 0.45, generalized morality decline to almost 0, and hard work increased
above 0.5. It is useful to look at the plot of original hard work variable against
the  I almost alway continue to work ....  statement (task variable). From
Figure 1. we can see sharp dierences between these items. In many countries,
people does not feel that hard work leads to success, yet when they are asked
about whether they keep working on a task until they feel satised with it,
the resulting number is surprisingly high. This suggests that the views about
hard work are not very well captured by our intial variable or inconsistency of
respondents.
7 Conlusion
In this thesis, we investigate the impact of four cultural traits, generalized moral-
ity, family ties, attitudes toward hard work, views about the appropriate role of
women in society, on GDP per worker. Growth economics literature has stressed
several issues with assessing importance and validity of potential determinants
of macroeconomic growth, namely reverse causality and omitted variable bias
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(Durlauf 2004; Fernandez et al. 2001). We attempt to alleviate both issues.
Reverse causality is addressed by employing instruments that have been widely
used in literature, namely legal origin, genetic distance, predicted trade shares
and pathogen prevalence. Additionally, we include historical plough use as an
instrument for views about the appropriate role of women in society. Omitted
variable bias is dealt with by including twenty-ve additional covariates from
dierent streams of growth economics research such as geography, trade, insti-
tutions and history. We deal with said issues by employing IVBMA framework
developed by Karl and Lenkoski (2012).
With regard to cultural variables, no clear winner resurfaced. Generalized
morality and perceptions of the appropriate role for women received very low
PIP in baseline results, 0.19 and 0.03 respectively. Attitudes toward hard work
received PIP of 0.3 in baseline results. Once we include additional items from
WVS, its PIP increased to 0.54, an indication that it is a vital determinant of
macroeconomic growth. The strongest support received family ties with PIP
of 0.66 in baseline specication, and decreases to 0.45 when we modify other
cultural variables. Additionally, we do nd strong support for trade view and
proponents of geography.
Our survey of literature, and our results lead us to the following reections:
(1) The way cultural traits, as are operationalized in current literature, might
not reect its theoretical counterpart very well. The change in PIP of attitudes
toward work is a good example. (2) Identication problems still remain. All
instruments we use are not free from criticism, and exclusion restrictions might
not be satised. For example, although legal origin is perceived as a relatively
good instrument for institutions, its PIP in rst stage regression is not very
high. By contrast, pathogen prevalence seems to be a stronger instrument for
institutions. (3) We assume linearity of our variables, but it is not likely that
most of the regressors are linear. For instance, family ties are likely to have a
negative impact on economic development at some point- very strong family ties
might induce amoral behaviour outside of the family circles, aggression towards
foreigners and less openness in general.
Moreover, cultural economics has identied numerous issues when comes to
analyzing culture - a leap from micro-level to macro-level, internal validity, a
vague denition of culture, and sample dependency to name a few. Researchers
need to be able to dene clearly the questions they address. Furthermore, em-
pirical research needs to be based on better quality data. Miller and Mitamura
(2003) propose a multidimensional measure which alleviates measurement and
conceptual issues associated with single-item variables. Also, it is important to
understand when culture matters. Recent literature has started to model inter-
play between institutions and culture which could advance our understanding
of the culture-institutions-growth relationship.
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Appendix
• Dependent variable: log of average GDP per worker between 1996 and
2000 taken from PWT 6.3. Citation: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and
Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for International
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Penn-
sylvania, August 2009.
• Family ties, generalized morality, hard work, view on the role
of women: World Values Survey, wave 3, 1995-1998. Citation: WORLD
VALUES SURVEYWave 3 1995-1998 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20140921.
World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggre-
gate File Producer: Asep/JDS, Madrid SPAIN.
• Hofstede's individualism dimension: https://geert-hofstede.com/national-
culture.html
• Genetic distance: Mahalanobis genetic distance between the population
in a given country and the population in the USA. Source: Gorodnichenko
and Roland (2013)
• Pronoun drop: Source: 1 if language allows to drop pronoun. Source:
Kashima and Kashima (1998)
• Legal origin: 1 if common law, 0=civil law. Source: La Porta et al.
(1998)
• Traditional plough use: is the estimated proportion of citizens with
ancestors that used the plough in pre-industrial agriculture. The variable
ranges from 0 to 1. The underlying data are from Ethnographic Atlas.
Source: Alesina et al. (2013)
• Predicted trade shares: logarithm of predicted trade shares computed
on the basis of a bilateral trade equation. Source: Dollar and Kraay (2003)
• Index of historical prevalance of infectious diseases: the index is
based on disease prevalence data obtained from old epidemiological atlases
and includes either 9 or 7 items (trypanosomes, leishmanias, schistosomes,
leprosy, malaria, typhus, lariae, tuberculosis and dengue). Source: Mur-
ray and Schaller (2009).
• Terrain ruggedness index: It is the average across points on a grid 1
kilometer apart within a country of an index of terrain ruggedness. The
index is dened as follows. Let er,c denote elevation at the point located in
row r and column c of a grid of elevation points. Then the Terrain Rugged-




j=c−1 (ei,j − er,c)
2
.
Source: Nunn and Puga (2012)
• ground frost: proportion of land with more than 5 frost-day per month
in winter
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• Institutions: 6 indicators of institutional quality: Voice and Account-
ability, Political Stabillity and Absence of Violence, Government Eec-
tiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption. Source:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
• Trade: logarithm of openness for year 1995. Source: Penn Tables 6.3.
Citation: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World
Table Version 6.3, Center for International Comparisons of Production,
Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, August 2009.
• absolute latitute: Source: Gallup et al. (1998)
• absolute longtitude: Source: Gallup et al. (1998)
• jurisdictional hiearchy beyond local community: the number of
jurisdictional hierarchies in the society to quantify the political sophisti-
cation of an ethnic group. The original measure, taken from variable v33
of the Ethnographic Atlas, measures the number of jurisdictional hierar-
chies beyond the local community. The variable takes on the values of 1 to
5, with 1 indicating no levels of hierarchy beyond the local community and
5 indicating four levels. Since the local community represents one level of
authority, the variable measures the number of jurisdictional hierarchies
in the society. Source: Alesina et al. (2013)
• tropical climate: fraction of land that is tropical or subtropical. Source:
Alesina et al. (2013)
• economic complexity: the measure comes from variable v30 of the
Ethnographic Atlas. Each ethnic group is categorized into one of the
following categories describing their pattern of settlement: nomadic or
fully migratory, semi-nomadic, semi-sedentary, compact but temporary
settlements, neighborhoods of dispersed family homes, separated hamlets
forming a single community, compact and relatively permanent, complex
settlements. The variable takes on the values of 1 to 8, with 1 indicat-
ing fully nomadic groups and 8 groups with complex settlement. Source:
Alesina et al. (2013)
• average temperature: is measured as average daily temperature (in
degrees Celsius), measured between 1950 and 1959. The underlying tem-
perature data are from the Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation:
1900-2006 Gridded Monthly Time Series, Version 1.10. Source: Alesina et
al. (2013)
• average precipitation: is measured as the average rainfall each month
(in millimeters) during the same time period. The underlying rainfall
data are from the Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: 1900-
2006 Gridded Monthly Time Series, Version 1.10. 8. Source: Alesina et
al. (2013)
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• communism dummy: 1 if the country was a communistic country.
Source: Alesina et al. (2013)
• distance from UK: logarithm of the population-weighted distance of a
country from the UK. Source: Gorodnichenko and Roland (2013)
• landlock dummy: 1 if the country is a landlocked country. Source:
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013)
• west-east hemisphere dummy: 1 if the country is located in western
hemisphere. Source: Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013)
• north-south hemisphere dummy: 1 if the country is located in south-
ern hemisphere. Source: Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013)
• island dummy: 1 if the country is an island. Source: Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2013)
• length of coastline: length of costline, in km. Source: Spolaore and
Wacziarg (2013)
• proportion of population within 100km of the coastline: the pro-
portion of the population in 1994 within 100 km of the coastline. Source:
Gallup et al. (1998)
• presence of large domesticated animals: the historical presence of
large domesticated animals is measured using variable v40 of the Ethno-
graphic Atlas. The original variable groups the type of animal husbandry
practiced into seven categories: absence of large domesticated animals;
pigs are the only large animals; presence of sheep and/or goats without
any larger domesticated animals; presence of equine animals; presence of
deer; presence of camels, alpacas or llamas; and presence of bovine ani-
mals. From the information, an indicator variable is created that equals
zero if the society is coded in the rst category and one if the society is
coded in the second to seventh category. Source: Alesina et al. (2013)
• soil depth: is measured as the proportion of ancestor's land within a 200
kilometer radius of the group's centroid that has been identied as having
`no', `few', or `slight' soil depth constraints. The soil data are from the
GAEZ 2002 database. Source: Alesina et al. (2013)
• practice of intensive agriculture: the measure is constructed from
variable v28 of the Ethnographic Atlas, which classies societies based on
their agricultural intensity. Ethnicities are grouped into one of the fol-
lowing categories: no agriculture, casual agriculture, extensive or shifting
agriculture, horticulture, intensive agriculture and intensive irrigated agri-
culture. The constructed indicator variable captures societies belonging
to the last two categories. Source: Alesina et al. (2013)
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• patrilocal society: the variable is constructed from variable v12 of the
Ethnographic Atlas. Ethnicities are grouped into the following categories
based on postmarital residence rules: avunculal, ambilocal, optionally ux-
orilocal or avunculocal, optionally patrilocal, matrilocal, neolocal, no com-
mon residence, patrilocal, uxorilocal or virilocal. From these categories,
an indicator for ethnic groups that are patrilocal is created.
• extended family: the information is taken from variable v8 of the Ethno-
graphic Atlas, which classies ethnic groups' family structures into the
following categories: independent (monogamous) nuclear family, inde-
pendent (polygynous) nuclear family, independent polyandrous families,
polygynous (with co-wives), polygynous (without co-wives), minimal ex-
tended families, small extended families, large extended families. Using
this information, an indicator for ethnic groups with extended families
(including minimal, small and large extended families) is created. Source:
Alesina et al. (2013)
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Table 3: Baseline results, rst stage, PIP
PIP Trade Family Morality Women Inst
genetic distance 0,433 0,488 0,504 0,501 0,492
pathogen 0,226 0,492 0,495 0,504 0,899
TradeIV 0,494 0,55 0,512 0,512 0,226
legal.origin 0,15 0,511 0,507 0,512 0,633
plow 0,14 0,496 0,507 0,498 0,403
int 0,999 0,499 0,5 0,496 0,509
hard.work 0,012 1 0,997 0,988 0,089
abs_long 0,002 0,76 0,278 0,857 0,014
abs_lati 0,01 0,997 1 0,962 0,034
frost.days5 0,126 0,479 0,506 0,496 0,591
economic_complexity 0,037 0,702 0,499 0,495 0,147
coastline 0 0 0,001 0 0
island 0,129 0,508 0,519 0,497 0,337
pop100km 0,23 0,515 0,504 0,511 0,384
political_hierarchies 0,048 0,486 0,513 0,501 0,49
intensity_agriculture 0,136 0,501 0,498 0,49 0,824
patrilocal 0,106 0,498 0,501 0,512 0,472
extended_fam 0,144 0,507 0,508 0,511 0,308
south 0,103 0,517 0,492 0,494 0,661
w_e 0,198 0,533 0,496 0,512 0,568
avg_temperature 0,016 0,979 0,459 0,423 0,072
avg_precipitation 0,001 0,637 0,236 0,171 0,012
communist_dummy 0,182 0,499 0,526 0,501 0,519
rugged 0,041 0,526 0,48 0,489 0,146
large_animals 0,13 0,495 0,484 0,503 0,616
soil_depth 0,601 0,488 0,482 0,488 0,472
landlocked 0,484 0,509 0,502 0,499 0,349
geo_UK_distw 0 0,038 0,086 0,007 0
tropical_climate 0,13 0,506 0,487 0,501 0,375
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Table 4: Baseline results, rst stage, Mean
Mean Trade Family Morality Women Insti
genetic distance -0,145 -0,002 -0,009 0,007 0,057
pathogen -0,031 -0,044 -0,078 0,107 -0,973
TradeIV 0,071 -0,361 -0,264 -0,075 0,006
legal.origin -0,018 -0,143 0,052 0,104 0,47
plow -0,012 -0,005 0,03 0,075 0,071
intercept 1,663 0,099 0,048 0,024 -0,283
hard.work 0 2,837 1,235 0,872 -0,004
abs_long 0 -0,278 -0,051 0,256 0
abs_lati 0 1,284 1,274 0,641 0,001
frost.days5 -0,004 -0,012 0,047 0,094 0,445
economic_complexity 0 0,888 0,167 -0,089 -0,005
coastline 0 0 0 0 0
island 0,01 0,015 0,055 -0,018 -0,021
pop100km 0,04 0,109 -0,031 -0,207 -0,018
political_hierarchies -0,001 0,044 0,134 0,188 -0,173
intensity_agriculture -0,006 0,012 -0,032 0,071 1,038
patrilocal 0,007 -0,023 -0,082 0,071 0,241
extended_fam 0,014 -0,093 0,035 0,152 -0,014
south 0,003 0,071 0,039 -0,024 0,524
w_e -0,029 0,282 -0,009 -0,203 -0,39
avg_temperature 0 2,086 0,226 0,188 0,003
avg_precipitation 0 0,168 0,035 -0,017 0
communist_dummy 0,021 0,093 -0,028 0,121 -0,327
rugged 0 0,235 0,059 -0,084 0
large_animals 0,011 0,004 0,019 0,104 0,556
soil_depth 0,268 0,064 0,026 -0,013 -0,155
landlocked 0,098 -0,025 0,064 0,194 0,087
geo_UK_distw 0 0 0 0 0
tropical_climate -0,005 0,074 -0,017 -0,002 0,078
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Table 6: Results for women2, rst stage, PIP
PIP Trade Family Ties Morality Women2 Institutions
pathogen 0,264 0,492 0,509 0,506 0,964
genetic distance 0,446 0,488 0,499 0,503 0,484
legal.origin 0,167 0,51 0,524 0,496 0,53
TradeIV 0,492 0,539 0,547 0,512 0,227
plow 0,152 0,497 0,495 0,498 0,396
intercept 1 0,491 0,51 0,491 0,524
hard.work 0,011 1 0,999 0,993 0,11
economic_complexity 0,028 0,68 0,489 0,494 0,12
island 0,137 0,479 0,486 0,493 0,356
intensity_agriculture 0,138 0,484 0,51 0,517 0,801
patrilocal 0,108 0,497 0,5 0,511 0,419
extended_fam 0,135 0,482 0,51 0,507 0,304
south 0,095 0,49 0,51 0,499 0,697
avg_temperature 0,014 0,985 0,449 0,442 0,064
avg_precipitation 0,002 0,549 0,256 0,169 0,004
communist_dummy 0,166 0,496 0,496 0,502 0,569
rugged 0,039 0,533 0,501 0,5 0,148
w_e 0,196 0,515 0,503 0,502 0,444
landlocked 0,466 0,484 0,504 0,501 0,322
geo_UK_distw 0 0,034 0,105 0,009 0
tropical_climate 0,116 0,501 0,502 0,508 0,391
pop100km 0,224 0,504 0,49 0,507 0,369
political_hierarchies 0,04 0,485 0,488 0,52 0,386
coastline 0 0 0,006 0,001 0
abs_long 0,001 0,724 0,363 0,983 0,013
abs_lati 0,011 1 1 0,969 0,03
frost.days5 0,123 0,518 0,485 0,496 0,481
large_animals 0,151 0,488 0,476 0,502 0,591
soil_depth 0,594 0,501 0,491 0,491 0,459
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Table 7: Results for women2, rst stage, Mean
Mean Trade Family Ties Morality Women2 Institutions
pathogen -0,036 -0,034 -0,099 0,07 -1,244
genetic distance -0,138 -0,003 -0,009 0,005 0,077
legal.origin -0,019 -0,134 0,052 0,066 0,327
TradeIV 0,071 -0,342 -0,303 -0,094 -0,021
plow -0,013 -0,006 0,023 0,044 0,026
intercept 1,669 0,093 0,048 0,023 -0,29
hard.work 0 2,828 1,233 1,054 -0,005
economic_complexity 0 0,833 0,195 0,013 -0,002
island 0,009 0,009 0,053 -0,014 -0,01
intensity_agriculture -0,007 0,017 -0,024 0,065 0,965
patrilocal 0,007 -0,014 -0,096 0,027 0,192
extended_fam 0,013 -0,083 0,032 0,112 -0,011
south 0,001 0,064 0,051 -0,024 0,578
avg_temperature 0 2,216 0,212 0,191 0,003
avg_precipitation 0 0,133 0,039 -0,018 0
communist_dummy 0,019 0,101 -0,035 0,094 -0,399
rugged 0 0,261 0,016 -0,131 -0,005
w_e -0,027 0,256 0,007 -0,122 -0,202
landlocked 0,092 -0,015 0,061 0,145 0,052
geo_UK_distw 0 0 0 0 0
tropical_climate -0,004 0,069 -0,015 0,012 0,072
pop100km 0,038 0,096 -0,027 -0,162 0,032
political_hierarchies -0,001 0,029 0,137 0,208 -0,118
coastline 0 0 0 0 0
abs_long 0 -0,232 -0,072 0,458 0
abs_lati 0 1,292 1,284 0,83 0,001
frost.days5 -0,006 -0,002 0,043 0,067 0,282
large_animals 0,012 0,013 0,023 0,095 0,504
soil_depth 0,262 0,064 0,035 0,004 -0,093
REFERENCES 56
































Table 9: Results for hard work2+women2, rst stage, PIP
PIP Trade Family Morality Women2 Institutions
pathogen 0,3 0,501 0,504 0,514 0,961
genetic distance 0,456 0,489 0,48 0,498 0,495
legal.origin 0,204 0,513 0,505 0,506 0,528
TradeIV 0,422 0,531 0,507 0,483 0,332
plow 0,143 0,499 0,5 0,498 0,423
intercept 1 0,506 0,483 0,492 0,573
hard.work2 0,004 1 0,912 1 0,185
south 0,1 0,499 0,512 0,491 0,64
w_e 0,133 0,514 0,508 0,519 0,5
intensity_agriculture 0,136 0,481 0,493 0,505 0,786
patrilocal 0,088 0,505 0,503 0,509 0,451
landlocked 0,468 0,49 0,506 0,515 0,328
geo_UK_distw 0 0,002 0,02 0,01 0
tropical_climate 0,12 0,483 0,492 0,5 0,357
pop100km 0,205 0,504 0,5 0,514 0,426
political_hierarchies 0,047 0,496 0,53 0,519 0,345
coastline 0 0,001 0 0,002 0
abs_long 0,006 0,282 0,14 0,997 0,014
abs_lati 0,006 0,576 0,995 0,489 0,06
frost.days5 0,148 0,497 0,483 0,509 0,575
avg_temperature 0,011 0,991 0,597 0,415 0,07
avg_precipitation 0,002 0,364 0,256 0,239 0,01
communist_dummy 0,187 0,501 0,504 0,495 0,563
rugged 0,037 0,555 0,49 0,493 0,151
large_animals 0,137 0,512 0,509 0,524 0,597
soil_depth 0,492 0,5 0,49 0,505 0,454
economic_complexity 0,029 0,655 0,514 0,479 0,166
island 0,145 0,512 0,488 0,499 0,366
extended_fam 0,135 0,488 0,497 0,504 0,31
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Table 10: Results for hard work2+women2, rst stage, mean
Mean Trade Family Morality Women2 Institutions
pathogen -0,045 -0,074 -0,038 0,037 -1,248
genetic distance -0,182 -0,004 -0,004 0,007 0,068
legal.origin -0,028 -0,088 0,12 0,044 0,309
TradeIV 0,058 -0,172 -0,211 0,007 -0,105
plow -0,013 0,029 0,055 0,06 0,047
intercept 1,704 0,072 0,04 0,009 -0,316
hard.work2 0 0,972 0,322 0,446 -0,004
south 0,002 0,052 0,029 -0,026 0,488
w_e -0,013 0,178 -0,077 -0,146 -0,285
intensity_agriculture -0,008 0,029 0,007 0,06 0,974
patrilocal 0,004 -0,01 -0,033 0,025 0,213
landlocked 0,094 -0,035 0,062 0,158 0,041
geo_UK_distw 0 0 0 0 0
tropical_climate -0,007 0,053 -0,004 -0,014 0,016
pop100km 0,033 0,116 -0,033 -0,166 0,109
political_hierarchies -0,001 0,024 0,254 0,163 -0,094
coastline 0 0 0 0 0
abs_long 0 -0,051 -0,012 0,487 0
abs_lati 0 0,374 1,203 0,206 0,002
frost.days5 -0,012 -0,008 0,047 0,073 0,438
avg_temperature 0 2,187 0,545 -0,013 0,003
avg_precipitation 0 0,074 0,045 -0,037 0
communist_dummy 0,025 0,073 -0,028 0,106 -0,399
rugged 0 0,364 0,074 -0,122 -0,012
large_animals 0,008 0,018 0,063 0,081 0,496
soil_depth 0,193 0,042 0,028 -0,017 -0,062
economic_complexity 0 0,751 0,218 -0,035 -0,01
island 0,012 0,003 0,053 -0,019 -0,051
extended_fam 0,012 -0,092 0,068 0,097 -0,003
